Czech Journal of Political Science
- Published 30.6.2022
- Volume 2022
- ISSN PRINT 1211-3247
- ISSN ONLINE 1805-9503
András Bíró-Nagy and Gergely Laki
Institute for Political Science, Budapest, Hungary
Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
Empirical research about the European Union’s impact on domestic public policy has been largely missing from academic research about Hungary. By presenting the results of analysis of three new databases, the aim of this study is to investigate the impact of the EU on Hungarian public policy between 2004 and 2018. The three aspects covered in this article are the Europeanization of law-making in the Hungarian parliament, the implementation of country-specific recommendations issued by the European Commission, and the similarities and differences between different governments in terms of handling infringement procedures. Our results show that the interaction between the Hungarian government (and in general, V4 governments) and the EU is much less conflictual at the policy level than what some high-profile political conflicts might suggest.
European integration; Europeanization; public policy; policy implementation; European Semester; Euroscepticism
University of Pardubice, Czech Republic
The paper seeks to explain how displays of emotion in the public sphere help to shape and structure our thinking about politics and how they challenge and transform the most fundamental philosophical concepts we use. The analysis focuses especially on the concept of freedom and the reactions accompanying its perceived lack or loss, including resentment, anger, fear and frustration. The aim is to show that no political theory is complete without analyzing emotions in the public sphere and assigning them their proper place. However, assigning emotions their proper place in political theory not only means recognizing their significance but also understanding the limits of their significance. The second part of the paper thus argues that assessing emotions relies at least in part on judgements concerning their ‘appropriateness’. The paper then concludes with a version of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, modelling the relation between displays of emotion in the public sphere and political theory.
Freedom; Resentment; Emotions; Legitimacy; Political realism
Zachary John Kramer (1989–2022) was a PhD candidate in the International Relations doctoral programme at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.
This study investigates the determinants of semi-democracy as a distinct but under-researched outcome among 12 of the 29 European and post-Soviet post-communist states. Institutional theory’s limitations in explaining enduring semi-democracy suggest other approaches may offer new insights, specifically realist international relations theory, given the concentration of unresolved conflicts, asymmetrical trade dependencies on regional powers, and revolutionary overthrows of government among the 12 semi-democracies. The study uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, incorporating both established institutional and novel power-relational conditions drawn from realist IR theory, finding that 10 of the cases fit four explanatory patterns, which suggest that institutional conditions do matter for democratization but are intertwined with and subordinated to realist conditions.
fsQCA; semi-democracy; realism; post-communism; transition
A New Chapter in the Evolution of Right-wing Populist Electoral Winning Formulas. The Implementation and Impact of Portfolio Diversification in AustriaDavid M. Wineroither and Gilg U.H. Seeber
David M. Wineroither
National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
Gilg U.H. Seeber
University of Innsbruck, Austria
Right-wing populist parties (RPPs) have been exceptionally successful in Austria since the mid-1980s. Since the mid-2000s, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) has faced challengers from within its own party family despite its continuing effort to adapt to shifting electoral markets. We argue that the exceptionally high vote shares secured by competing RPPs in multiple rounds of general elections can be attributed to a new winning formula of portfolio diversification. Supply-side data show that the FPÖ and its rivals varied widely in their policy-based and non-programmatic efforts of linkage building with voters. Using ESS data, we find evidence in the class basis of party electorates that suggests patterns of diversified linkage efforts expanded the joint voter base of RPPs by gaining support among groups of voters hitherto not resonating with RPPs while holding on to the vote of their core constituency. In addition, portfolio diversification plausibly allows RPPs to moderate some of their specific electoral vulnerabilities (e.g. cross-class appeal, repercussions of participation in government).
Accountability; party competition; electoral behaviour; right-wing populism; representation
Populist Conspiracy Theories in the 2016 US Presidential Election. A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of Conspiratorial DemonizationPatrick Sawyer
HSE University, Moscow, Russia
This study focuses on the consequences of conspiracy theories on voter behaviour. I argue that conspiracism is not simply a tendency of populist movements but also holds instrumental value; the candidates and supporters can use conspiracy theories to demonize their opponents, thus resulting in a lower tendency of voters to cast their ballot for them. Given the lack of detailed data concerning adherence to certain conspiracy theories, search aggregate data concerning interest in the conspiracy theory from Google Trends was taken in order to overcome this. Taking the case of Donald Trump’s 2016 Presidential campaign, the utilization of a multi-level regression model demonstrates that voters were less likely to vote for Clinton in states where interest in the anti-Clinton conspiracy theory was highest, testifying to a ‘demonization’ effect. The anti-Clinton conspiracy theories, which included allegations of high-level corruption and plots by political and financial elites, were shown to be effective on lower-income, lower-educated voter cohorts, and members of the white working-class, but not ideological conservatives. These results imply that spreading conspiracy theories finds the most success when it targets those groups which were not necessarily inclined to support a certain candidate from the outset.
Conspiracy theories; populism; Othering; Donald Trump; Hillary Clinton; the radical right