Archive 3/2000

Abstract

The paper describes the political systems of microstates. At the beginning we had some problems with the definition of „microstate" because political geography has not defined it precisely. We take two criteria: size of territory and population. So, we say that the microstate is a state with territory smaller than 1 000 km-. The practice shows that this definition is a very broad term. We think that there should be defined three main types and one side type of microstates: 1) small microstates (0-100 km2), 2) medium microstates (100-500 km2), 3) large microstates (500-1 000 km-) and 3b) large microstates with a lot of inhabitants (more than 500 000). According to these definitions we can recognize 24 microstates - Vatican, Monaco, Nauru, Tuvalu and San Marino (small microstates); Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, Maledives, Malta, Grenada, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Barbados, Antigua a Barbuda, Seychelles, Andorra and Palau (medium microstates); St. Lucia, Micronesia, Tonga, Dominica and Kiribati (large microstates); Bahrain and Singapore (large microstates with a lot of inhabitants). Of course, “only state can be a state”, so we don’t include to our text non-sovereign units as colonies, autonomous regions, private states, dependencies, inside-country regions, enclaves etc. In our analysis of political systems of microstates we focus on forms of government, types of administrative systems, structures of parliaments, types of electoral systems and, last but not least, types of party systems. We can see a big diversity of politics in microstates. There are democracies, authoritarian regimes and semi-democracies, monarchies and republics, parliamentary and presidential regimes, federations and unitary states, unicameral and bicameral assemblies, plurality and majority electoral systems, multiparty and biparty or nonparty systems. What is the most important- despite of their smaltnes, all of them have “big” systems such as normal “adult” countries.

Key words

Political systems, small countries, microstates

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In the development of bicameralism we can differ two traditions: the Montesquieu’s tradition of bicameral parliament as an instrument of division of state’s power and the American tradition of bicameralism, in which the second chamber is a component not only horizontal, but also vertical division of power - the second chamber represents the member states in the federation. The most of the world’s second chambers are created on the principal of territorial representation. The first group of territorial chambers are the federative chambers, the second one are the regional chambers in decentralized unitarian states. There are four regional chambers in the western Europe: in France, in Italy, in the Netherlands and in Spain. In Lijphart’s typology are the Netherlandish and Italian Senates congruent. The French Senate is partially and indirectly elected each 3 years by regional electors; it has more influence and authority than powers - the National assembly can decide in the end in nearly all cases. The Italian Senate is atypically powerful - the equal bicameralism is usual in federative states. The senators are directly elected in provinces for 5 years with exception of dissolution. The Senate can iniciate a motion of distrust to the government. The First Chamber in the Netherlands is only the chamber of ratification - de iure has “the last word”. The senators are elected for 4 years by regional councils. In the Spanish Senate there are two groups of senators: directly elected in provinces and indirectly elected by regional assemblies. All senators have 4 year’s term. The main function of the Senate is to be link between the central politics and autonomous communities.

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Senate, Western europe, regional second chambers

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The radical reform of the electoral system to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic provoked a great discussion. The reform, prepared by the two most powerful political parties - ODS /the Civic Democratic Party/ and ČSSD /Czech social democratic party/, aims to strengthen the majority effect of the electoral system. As a result, the set up of stable and majority governments should be easier. This study makes readers familiar with the fundamental points of the reform and tries to analyse its possible consequences. In details, it focuses on the possible impacts on the party system. In depth, it studies the result of combining small constituencies, the so-called “modified d’Hondt formula” (the product of this electoral reform) and a non-standard closing clause. Model calculations of the elections 1992, 1996 and 1998 were one of its main empirical sources. By means of different variations of model calculations, it attempts to indicate some possible trends of changes inside the party system. After the application of this particular electoral system, changes could be very essential. This study aims to present a detailed description of the main points of the new electoral system but also to supplement the basis for the discussion about the accord between this new electoral system and the Constitution. We can find the inconsistency with the constitutional text especially in the question whether the elections with the use of the new electoral system would take place according to the principles of proportional representation. At the present, this problem is being discussed by the Constitutional Court (August, September 2000).

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Reform, electoral system, Czech republic, parliament, chamber of deputies, d’Hondt formula

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There is an intension to analyze a phenomenon of electoral reform in the postcommunist region - concretely in the Czech Republic. The question is: what are die main forces behind continuity and discontinuity of electoral rules? In other words what kinds of factors function in favour with discontinuity and what kinds of factors limit such discontinuity? There can be identified not only institutional and socio-structural factors but also specific historical preconditions and cultural pattern. In the Czech Republic were made unprecedented efforts of two winning parties to change an electoral system only on instrumental base. The electoral engineering is “perfect”, because these two parties prepared an electoral reform behind the scene, and prepared probably the most disproportional and unique PR system existing in standard democracies. There is no other limits for this kind of manipulation than their own power and interests. Because they are just now temporarily more powerful (in the sense of parliamentary majority), they want to push instrumental changes independently of other factors and barriers.

Key words

Electoral reform, czech republic, postcommunist region, electoral rules

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Rein Taagepera, leading American political scientist, offers a brief outline on the topic of possible variants of PR principle. He mainly uses a method of comparison between majoritarian and proportional principles. He characterizes under what conditions the PR principle acquires some of the features of its counterpart and vice versa. Finally, the author concludes the principle of proportionality is respected if the constituencies offer more than one mandate. Similarly, he also considers the impact of different formulas of which Imperiali rule is seen as the most interesting example.

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Principle of proportionally, taagepera, majoritarian principle

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The present article analyses legal aspects of the position of national minorities (ethnic groups) in Austria. After World War II Austria on several occasions acquired the status of a state which is concerned about the protection of national minorities in Europe. The drafts presented by Austria on the international level must be considered as being very valuable and progressive contributions to the discussion. However, on the domestic level, Austria did not fulfill its international obligations as laid down in treaties which were concluded after World War I (Treaty of St. Germain 1919) and in 1955 (Treaty of Vienna). Concerning the Slovene minority in Carinthia and the Croat minority in Burgenland various language rights and rights in the field of education have not been enforced by legislative and administrative bodies. In some leading judgements the Austrian Constitutional Court has confirmed the deficiencies in the Austrian system for the protection of minorities. In the last decade the political actors have become more sensitive to the problems of national minorities in Austria. In the next years it will be necessary to find a transparent legislative solution which fully complies with Austria’s international obligations.

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National minorities, Austria, ethnic groups

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Russell Kirk (2000). Konzervativní smýšlení, Praha: Občanský institut. 582 pages.

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Jiří Hanuš (ed.) (2000). Náboženství v době společenských změn, Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav.

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Caspar von Schrenck-Notzig (ed.) (1996). Lexikon des Konservatismus, Graz/Stuttgart: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 607 pages.

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Dne 7. června 2000 se v budově Poslanecké sněmovny uskutečnila konference věnovaná problematice novely zákona o volbách do Parlamentu.

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Ve dnech 15. a 16. června uspořádaly katedra veřejné správy a katedra politologie Vysoké školy obchodní ve Varšavě odbornou konferenci věnovanou problematice evropské integrace států střední a východní Evropy.

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