

Attitudes Driving Support for PEGIDA – a 2015–16 Two-Wave Panel Study*

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Abstract

At the end of 2014, a right-wing populist movement named PEGIDA emerged in Germany, starting in Dresden. Whereas branches of this movement disappeared within a few months all across the country, the movement in Dresden persists. This article seeks to uncover the attitudes behind this movement. Derived from literature regarding the voting of right-wing populist parties in Europe we built an analytic model considering group-focused enmity, political disenchantment, distrust in media, right-wing attitudes, fears of extremism, foreign domination as well as of economic decline, as conceivable predictors of support for PEGIDA. With a time lag of twelve months, we conducted a two-wave web survey with inhabitants of Dresden within a representative, recruited, online panel. Our results show that the most important factors driving the support for PEGIDA are hostility against foreigners, fears of foreign domination, distrust in the media and right-wing attitudes. However, political disenchantment and fears of economic decline do not play a role in explaining the support for PEGIDA.

Keywords: populism; right-wing populism; Germany; PEGIDA; group-focused enmity; political disenchantment; media criticism; right-wing attitudes; web survey; panel study; binary-logistic regression analysis

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1. Background – PEGIDA

Starting in October 2014 in Dresden, a citizen's movement named *PEGIDA* entered the public arena. PEGIDA is an acronym and stands for: 'Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung Des Abendlandes' [Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Christian West]. Every Monday since then, they have staged a so-called 'Abendspaziergang' [evening walk] through the city of Dresden. Several weeks after its formation, at the end

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of 2014/beginning of 2015, this kind of protest march was copied in other German cities under the same label, simply adjusting the first letters of the acronym to the particular city or region (Bavaria: BAGIDA, Leipzig: LEGIDA, Munich: MUGIDA, Rostock: ROGIDA, etc.). Furthermore, citizens in other countries (Czech Republic, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Australia, etc.) also borrowed the idea of the movement. Whereas the local and worldwide adaptations of PEGIDA quickly disappeared, in October 2016, PEGIDA is still able to attract people for their protest marches in Dresden. While the number of participants grew, public discussion, especially in the public media, raised the question whether these protesters were simply citizens dissatisfied with the general political situation or if they could be assigned to the right wing political scene in Germany. Despite clear messages, slogans and flags from the right spectrum, both organization as well as participants stated that there is no right-wing background. This study investigates which attitudes drive the sympathy for the movement. Are those who identify with the movement (at least to some extent) really just concerned citizens or are they driven by attitudes which can be linked to right-wing movements?

In the beginning the main issue of the movement was the warning against the Islamization of the Christian West. Facing an increasing number of refugees coming to Germany, as well as to the whole of Europe, at the end of 2014, they primarily expressed their fears of Islamic terrorism and foreign domination due to the number of Muslims from the Near East and North Africa. But soon after, the agenda was broadened. At least since the beginning of 2015, the claims and accusations of the movement covered a much broader range of issues. The more specific fear of Islamization was extended by a diffuse xenophobia and nationalistic sentiments. Associated, again, with the latter was a fundamental critique towards the European Union and globalization. Additional issues were grouped around these core elements. By using the combat term of 'Lügenpresse' (lying press), the marchers expressed a deep distrust in the media. They turned against the 'GEZ' (the organization that collects the fees for public broadcasting in Germany) and accused journalists as well as the media in general of being dependent on the economy and the government. They called for peace with Russia combined with anti-Americanism and voiced a fundamental distrust in politicians, political parties, the government and the political sphere as a whole. Later, this critique focused more specifically on the left wing of the left-right political spectrum.

At first glance, the PEGIDA movement looked like a conglomeration of very different claims and accusations, gathering different people from different spaces with different goals under one umbrella. Indeed, the demonstrators came from different layers of the population and in interviews (Patzelt 2015; Vorländer et al. 2015) they expressed some of the motives mentioned above while rejecting others. PEGIDA soon was a melting pot of 'besorgte Bürger' [concerned citizens] with different, sometimes diffuse fears, but also of neo-Nazis and other extremists from the extreme right, conspiracy theorists, nationalists, and the like. A main frame of the movement is a *we against them* posture; mirrored in the phrase 'Wir sind das Volk' [We are the people]. *We*, the protesters, are 'das Volk' (the people). *They* are the elites, either politicians, media, or other institutions.

With the features described above, PEGIDA echoes the agenda of right-wing populist parties (RPP) in Europe. The rise of these political parties since the early 1980s was the ob-

ject of several studies in political and social sciences. While RPP could be observed all over Europe, there has never been a right-wing populist citizen's movement of this longevity in other countries.

In the first part of our study, we aim to prove if PEGIDA belongs to the sphere of right-wing populism in Europe. In the second part, we analyze which of the different attitudes intertwined with populism drive the participation in this movement and whether there have been any changes since the PEGIDA marches started. Therefore, a two-wave panel study was conducted.

2. Populism

Following Rensman, populism is first and foremost a 'politischer Kampfbegriff' [political combat term] (Rensmann 2006: 59). It contains the accusation of simplification and polarization. In social science, the concept was believed to be un-operationalizable, because of the very diverse phenomena which were subsumed under this label (Rensmann 2006: 59–61; Taggart 2004: 272). Populism was designated to specific political styles, communication strategies, forms of government, ideologies as well as protest movements (Hafez 2010: 36). Moreover, populism is not assigned to a specific political or social faction. There are right-wing populist parties like the *Front National* in France or neo-liberal populist parties like Berlusconi's *Forza Italia*, as well as left-wing populists like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or *Die LINKE* in Germany (Akkermann et al. 2014: 1325).

Some researchers see populism as a distinctive communication strategy: 'Populism (...) is essentially a rhetorical posture' (Brett 2013: 410). Others understand populism as an ideology or at least, such as Rensmann (2006), recognize some ideological core elements. Concerning the notion as an ideology, Taggart (2004) counters that populism lacks central, shared values (Taggart 2004: 276), or as Dimitrov (2009) puts it: Populism lacks an 'einheitliche Glaubenslehre' [a coherent doctrine] (Dimitrov 2009: 313). Bischoff and Müller (2004: 22) do not see a cohesive conception of the world either, but an ongoing adjustment to current sentiments and moods within the citizens.

In order to gain scientific access to the phenomenon beyond case studies, Taggart (2004: 273) recommends searching for common features of populism instead of typologization. Decker (2006) states that researchers should divide between form and content of populism. While content is highly variable, the form shows some similarities, particularly concerning structure, organization, and rhetoric (Decker 2006: 11). These similarities also apply for historical perspectives in populism research (Rensmann 2006: 62). Hereafter, we aim to examine the degree to which PEGIDA fits to the form of RPP described by several authors.

A first lucid feature of populist parties is the charismatic leader on the top (Rensmann 2006: 67; Hafez 2010: 39; Taggart 2004: 273; Linden 2008: 4; Akkerman et al. 2014: 1328; Oesch 2008: 354; Decker 2006: 17), often combined with a more or less apparent strict hierarchical structure. This can be observed in the rise of nearly all successful populist parties, for example Jörg Haider (FPÖ, Austria), Geert Wilders (PVV, Netherlands), Jean-Marie Le Pen

(FN, France), Hugo Chavez (Venezuela) or Gregor Gysi (Die LINKE, Germany). The dependency on a strong leader was obvious in the case of the Dutch party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*. After the murder of the name-giver, the party virtually disappeared (Decker 2006: 18). Like the parties mentioned above, PEGIDA was built around one person (Lutz Bachmann) too, but they additionally invite charismatic speakers such as the right-wing mentor Götz Kubitschek (Germany) or Geert Wilders from the PVV (Netherlands).

A second formal – and more important – core-element of populism has its roots in the term itself. Populism is derived from Latin *populus* (the people). By emphasizing the people, the rhetoric of populism is built upon a simple black-and-white dichotomization of *the people* and *the elites*. *The people* are the good, hardworking, trustworthy, and honest people. *The elites* instead are deceitful, parasitic, and corrupt. Contrary to *the people*, who are imagined as a more or less homogeneous mass, the elites are variable in conception. Depending on the societal or political situation, *the elites* can either be politicians or political parties but the economy, the media, the bourgeoisie or EU-bureaucrats can be as well (Rensmann 2006: 64). ‘Populism, at its essence, sees society as divided into two antagonistic groups: the people, invoked in an idealized “pure” form, and the elites, who are seen as corrupt in both practices and values’ (Linden 2008: 3; cf. Akkerman et al. 2014: 1326f.; see also Hafez 2010: 36; Priester 2012; Mazzoleni 2003).

Based on this dichotomization and evaluation, populists claim to be the mouthpiece of the people and to enforce *the will of the people* (Dimitrov 2009: 310). Rensmann (2006: 64) stated that all other issues and messages are imbedded into this frame narrative of the contradiction between the people and the elite. Given that, Dimitrov (2009: 311) notes that populists are not inherently anti-democratic. Despite the fact that they reject the notion of a representational party democracy (Decker 2006: 17), with the emphasis on *the people* they “echo the ‘orthodox rhetoric’ of democracy itself” (Mazzoleni 2003: 4). In this conceptualization, *the people* is to be strengthened as the real sovereign (Rensmann 2006: 64). That’s why populists usually call for more direct democracy, e.g., through support of referenda (Mazzoleni 2003: 5; Rensmann 2006: 6). This is what makes the difference between extremists and populists. Extremists seek to overcome the system; populists state that they want to reform it (Rensmann 2006: 67). There is a thin line between extremists and populists which is why they can converge within the same movement or party, observable e.g. when looking at the *Front National* in France (Decker 2006: 16).

To underline the importance of the people, PEGIDA adopted the slogan ‘Wir sind das Volk!’ [We are the people!] from the German Peaceful Revolution of 1989. The content of the phrase *the people* can be very diverse, depending on the political camp the populists are in. Left-wing populism distances the people vertically from the elites. Right-wing populism not only distances the people vertically, but differentiates also horizontally between the people and *the others* (Hafez 2010: 37). Right-wing populists (as well as right-wing extremists) advocate the notion of a cultural homogeneous nation which is to be separated from those who deviate from *the people*. Therefore, right-wing populism contains an anti-egalitarian moment (Decker 2006: 23; also cf. Rensmann 2006: 65). With the notion of a homogeneous mass of people, right-wing populism is the antithesis to the pluralism of Western societies (Akkerman et al. 2014: 1328), as well as the antithesis to the egalitarianism of left-wing populism such as in Latin America.

While the assumption of homogeneity is a core element, a definition of this homogeneous mass of people is lacking: such a definition would reveal that this assumed homogeneity is fiction (Hafez 2010: 40). Populists are unable to describe common features of *the people* aside from language skills and loyalty to the constitution (Zick, Küpper 2015: 173). One strategy used to solve this problem is to proclaim a quasi-evolution of *the people*, evolved from a region, a nation or a country. All long-time residents therefore belong to *the people*. But the vagueness of the characteristic of the people still remains.

The assumed homogeneity of the people can only be established by dissociation from *the others* (Zick, Küpper 2015: 154). Depending on the current social and political situation, *the others* can be minority groups such as homosexuals, the disabled, homeless people (Zick, Küpper 2015: 162), or, more frequently, specific ethnic groups. Important for the current situation in Europe is the agenda of defending Christian-European values that evolved in the early 1990s. Since 9/11, Islam seems to constitute a constant threat to the Western World. These days, this notion gets promoted by media coverage about the so-called 'Islamic State' terror-regime in the Near East and Africa. At the same time, confronted additionally with an increasing number of refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Egypt, etc., feelings of insecurity emerge among the population. This notion of a threat from outside is what Goodwyn (1978) describes as the *Populist Moment*. It means a situation in which the traditional and familiar way of living seems to be threatened and this situation is perceived as a common fate (Hafez 2010: 38). It is hardly surprising that the common enemy stereotype of all current right-wing populist parties is Islam (Rosenthal 2011: 59; Bischoff, Müller 2004: 16f). Hafez (2010) identifies common anti-Islamic themes: demographic Islamization, terror threat, political Islam, fanaticism, cultural otherness (Hafez 2010: 91). All these issues cannot only be found within the RPP all over Europe, but also within PEGIDA. Most interestingly, ethnic minorities, such as Turkish inhabitants that were formerly labeled as 'Gastarbeiter' [guest workers], now get a new label. From now on they are *the others* not because they are Turks, but because they are Muslims. It is a transformation from an ethnic group into a religious-cultural group (Klein, Heitmeyer 2015: 93) with the same result. A similar 're-tagging' can be observed within some of the established RPPs. Former anti-Semitic parties like FPÖ under Jörg Haider or the Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen step-by-step replace the anti-Semitic posture with the new anti-Islamic posture (Rosenthal 2011: 63) – with great success. With this programmatic change comes an ambivalent, mostly even positive attitude towards Israel, which sometimes confuses observers of right-wing populism. But this point also differentiates the right-wing extremists from the right-wing populists (Rosenthal 2011: 61ff.).

It is important to note that despite the current focus on Islam, the *outgroup* is always interchangeable (Klein, Heitmeyer 2015: 90f). Following Meyer (2006), populists are capable of incorporating any popular stereotype or sentiment of the population into their ideology (Meyer 2006: 82). This is part of what Taggart (2004) describes as 'the empty heart of populism' (Taggart 2004: 275). And Mudde (2014) terms populism in this regard as a 'thin ideology' (Mudde 2014: 218).

Somewhat surprising, another core feature associated with the notion of a homogeneous nation is the lack of traditional racism. While nationalism is part of the brand essence of right-wing populism (Dimitrov 2009: 312), populists usually do not deny a principal equality

of different nations and ethnicities as the extreme right does. But, besides the principal equality, the different ethnicities should be separated and not mingled (Bischoff, Müller 2004: 20; Rensmann 2006:70). This 'Ethnopluralismus' [ethnic pluralism] is different from the traditional biology-based racism of the right-wing extremists, albeit the biology-based racism is merely replaced by a culture-based racism (Hafez 2010: 41f.). PEGIDA also uses ethnic pluralism within its argumentation: We do not have any objections against foreigners, but they do not belong to Germany.

From this ethnocentric notion, populists derive a preference for long-time residents (Spier 2006: 51). The various 'Pro-Parties' (e.g. Pro-NRW) in Germany mirrored this demand. The same argument is articulated by PEGIDA. An often cited example was a speaker at Christmas time 2014 who uttered his annoyance because the asylum seekers get everything they wanted and pensioners could not even buy themselves a piece of Christmas stollen [sweet German bread, a famous specialty from Dresden]. This is an example of what Bischoff and Müller (2004) call 'Wohlfahrtchauvinismus' [welfare-chauvinism] (Bischoff, Müller 2004: 17). Considering the crisis of the European welfare systems, this seems to be a fertile ground for right-wing populists.

A last core feature of right-wing populism that also differentiates extremists from populists is the recourse to a golden past. Extremists usually develop a utopian ideal of society and government. Populists instead romanticize a golden past as the ideal for society. Taggart (2004) terms this as the 'heartland' (Taggart 2004: 274).

Hitherto, populist movements have vanished after a short time (Bischoff et al. 2004: 7; Taggart 2004: 270), but Mazzoleni (2003: 5) states that this may be a false impression. Due to their adaptability, populist movements can reappear anytime as the sentiments behind populism smolder below the surface. This also applies to PEGIDA. The movement picked up and fostered current fears of Islamization and at the same time reactivated and invigorated older discussions like the debate regarding the 'Leitkultur' [dominant culture] (cf. Pautz 2005). In the eyes of PEGIDA, the (homogeneous mass of) German people represent the 'Leitkultur' and *the Muslims* are a threat to this. Additionally, Islam is portrayed as incompatible to the 'Leitkultur'. Doing this, PEGIDA pretends to defend a diffuse mainstream society against a diffuse threat from outside. Mudde (2014) termed this 'Nativism', '(...) a xenophobic form of nationalism in which a mono-cultural nation-state is the ideal and all non-natives (i.e. aliens) are perceived as a threat to the nation' (Mudde 2014: 218).

Taken together we can conclude that PEGIDA contains all the key features of right-wing populism in Europe. The protestors define themselves as *the people*, and delineate them from the Muslims who are portrayed as a threat to the people and the country. They express distrust towards the elites, particularly politicians, political parties and the media. Politicians are seen to be corrupt, at least lazy, at worst 'Volksverräter' [traitors to the people]. Media and journalists are seen to be dependent on and controlled by the government and are accused of deliberately lying to the people. They criticize the European Union and call for more national autonomy. They demand more direct democracy and call for peace with Russia, combined with anti-American sentiments. In doing so, they echo the whole agenda of current right-wing populism in Europe (cf. Rensmann 2006: 66; Mazzoleni 2003: 5; Taggart 2004: 270; Mudde 2014).

Despite the fact that PEGIDA attract many right-wing extremists, neo-Nazis, conspiracy theorists and the like, at the peak of the movement also so called 'ordinary people' participated in the rallies. That is one of the reasons why a vivid debate arose not just within civil society but also within academia around the question about what motivates people to participate in the movement. Several studies tried to analyze the participants of PEGIDA, mainly by face-to-face interviews at the rallies (for an overview see Reuband 2015). However, participation in evening walks every Monday not only relies on shared attitudes but also time and proximity and several specific sociodemographic variables (cf. Daphi et al. 2015). This study aimed to analyze the attitudes driving the support for PEGIDA within the whole population of Dresden. Thus, the research question for the first wave of this two-wave panel study which took place in January 2015 was:

RQ1: Which attitudes drive the sharing of the goals of PEGIDA?

At the beginning of 2015, it was expected by many people that PEGIDA would fade out within the following months. But the movement persisted and seemed to become more radical, at least in their rhetoric, during the course of the year. In autumn 2015, for example, there were implicit calls to overthrow the system (Schielicke 2015). Furthermore, some of the topics and issues mentioned above seem to have receded (economy) while others increased in importance (nationalism). Therefore, one year later, in January 2016, we conducted a second wave of the study with the same main research question. Since there are hints of polarization in the population as well as slight changes at least in the importance of the issues we added the following second research question:

RQ2: What changes can be observed in the attitudes that drive the sharing of the goals of PEGIDA?

3. Attitudes driving populism

There is much research concerning the definition, description and prospect of populism as well as the question whether it changes the contemporary European political system or not. Only a minor part recently asked for the attitudes of the people as a source of populism (Akkerman et al. 2014: 1324). Usually, the dependent variable in these studies is the voting for RPPs.

Presumed causes for populist sentiments in general are manifold. Beside the processes and consequences of modernization (Spier 2006), there are notions of perceived or actual worsening of individual economic situations (Bischoff, Müller 2004: 9f), distrust in politics and institutions (Bischoff, Müller 2004: 19; Decker 2006: 13–15; Plasser, Ulram 2003) as well as the weakening ties of the major parties (Decker 2006: 18; Klein, Heitmeyer 2015: 95). Concerning right-wing populism, it can be assumed that also basic xenophobic resentments (Bischoff, Müller 2004: 10) as well as nationalistic attitudes lead to populist movements like PEGIDA. It is often suggested that xenophobic resentments are intertwined with fears of


economic losses. However, analyzing ESS-data for Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland, Oesch (2008) found that 'cultural conflict' explains more variance in the voting of RPP than 'economic conflict': 'The decisive variable for RPP voting seems to be the fear that immigration undermines a country's culture: it is highly significant in all five countries' (Oesch 2008: 359). Welfare chauvinism (the economic argument) is only a significant variable for France and Switzerland even though the economic argument is weaker than the cultural argument (Oesch 2008: 359). Ivarsflaten (2008) also sought to find out which factor explains the voting for RPPs. She compared three different models for seven European countries (Austria, Denmark, Flanders, France, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland): an economic grievance model, a political disillusionment model and an immigration grievance model. She found that 'only the immigration issue unifies an otherwise heterogeneous group of populist right parties' (Ivarsflaten 2008: 18). Unlike the findings of Ivarsflaten, political disillusionment was cited as an explanatory factor in many of the studies carried out at the PEGIDA rallies (see, e.g., Patzelt 2015). Interest and participation in politics is indeed on the decline. In a German survey, only half of the citizens stated that they were interested in politics (Petersen et al. 2013). The situations in other European countries and the US are similar (cf. World Value Survey 2010–2014). Disinterest in politics seems to be correlated to rising negative attitudes towards politics in general and politicians in particular (Cook, Gronke 2005; Haas 2014), resulting in increasing political cynicism. Regarding political disenchantment, Fieschi and Heywood (2004) investigated the influence of political trust and cynicism on RPP voting. Analyzing six countries (France, Austria, UK, Spain, Germany, Italy), they found that voters of populist parties distrust institutions in general (Fieschi, Heywood 2004: 307). Oesch (2008) found protest voting only in Belgium, France and Norway. He assumes that protest voting appears to be an influential factor in voting for RPP because RPPs still have a 'pariah status in the political arena' in these countries (Oesch 2008: 369).

In line with the general distrust in institutions of different kinds, people at PEGIDA rallies frequently expressed their distrust in media coverage and media institutions. In fact, studies dealing with media criticism come to the conclusion that trust in media in general and journalists in particular has been decreasing over the last decades or has remained stable at an already low level (cf. Cook, Gronke 2007: 270; IfD Allensbach 2013; Schielicke et al. 2014; PEW Research Center 2013). Fieschi and Heywood (2004) found no support for the assumption that distrust in the media leads to voting for populist parties. Plasser and Ulram (2003: 30f.) detected a robust relationship between right-wing populist attitudes and the use of a specific kind of media in Austria, however. Among those Austrians using quality media, only 16 percent expressed concerns about immigration, identity and the welfare system, but the share of concerned people rises with the usage of tabloid media. One out of four Austrians who use local news media and nearly half of the users of tabloids voice the concerns mentioned above. These correlations do not disappear when controlling for age and education (Plasser, Ulram 2003: 30–33). Like Hafez (2010), Plasser and Ulram (2003) suggest a kind of 'newsroom populism' – a media coverage consisting of pictures, individual cases, plain language, and sensationalism (Plasser, Ulram 2003: 28) – behind these results.

4. Method

4.1. Overview

Group-Focused Enmity (GFE), Media Criticism (MC), Political Disenchantment (PD), Fears and Worries (FW), Right-Wing Attitudes (RWA) and Criticism of Capitalism (CC) are the dependent variables which are assumed to drive the support for PEGIDA. Because we are interested in the attitudes behind PEGIDA, we do not use participation in the rallies as a dependent variable, but instead use the question whether one shares the goals of PEGIDA or not. Figure 1 shows the analytical model to answer the RQ1: Which attitudes drive the support for the goals of PEGIDA?



To answer the given questions, we conducted a non-representative web survey with a probability-based online panel of Dresden residents (PBP) who had previously consented to be interviewed via web surveys. Participants of the panel have been recruited via representative telephone surveys since 2011 and at the time of the first wave (t_1) there were about 3,000 participants listed in the panel.

The first survey invitation was sent out January, 9th 2015 (t_1). To identify changes in attitudes (RQ2), we invited all participants from the first wave one year later (January, 8th 2016) for the second wave of the study (t_2). In each wave, a reminder was sent out five days later.

4.2. Measures

To ascertain the amount of support for PEGIDA within the population of Dresden, we asked the participants whether they share the goals of PEGIDA (at least partially) or not. This question represents the dependent variable in the analytic model (see figure 1).

Based on the findings from the literature mentioned above dealing with attitudes that drive the voting for RPP, we assemble the independent variables to answer our research questions.

Even though PEGIDA focuses on Muslims and asylum seekers we used the construct of Group-Focused Enmity (GFE) (Zick et al. 2008; Borstel, Heitmeyer 2012; Beckmann 2012) to measure the hostility against and the devaluation of *others*. GFE mirrors the interchangeability of the out-groups in our analytic model. GFE originally contains nine core dimensions: sexism, devaluation of homosexuals, devaluation of the homeless, devaluation of disabled persons, devaluation of newcomers, Islamophobia, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism (Zick et al. 2008: 366). Because of the interchangeability of *the others*, in some studies specific dimensions were added (e.g. Borstel, Heitmeyer 2012; Beckmann 2012). In our study, in addition to the core dimensions we used items mirroring the devaluation of asylum seekers, because this group is explicitly mentioned in a number of PEGIDA statements.

The second construct we added to the model is media criticism (MC). There is a vivid discussion about measuring trust in media. Basically, there are three approaches to tackling this issue. First, one can evaluate the media used by the respondents. This, however, limits the evaluation to the media that presumably already receive a higher share of trust – compared to the media the respondents do not use. Second, one can test compliance with normative standards of media production, which excludes other factors than normative standards as independent variables of trust in media. Last, one could conduct an evaluation based on a more unspecific question about trust in the media or the work of journalists in general (cf. Schielicke et al. 2014). We chose the latter one for our study, because it enables us to capture more affective, less elaborated evaluations of journalists' work apart from their own media portfolio or normative standards.

To measure the degree of political disenchantment (PD), we applied a three-dimensional index of items based on the Spiral of Disidentification Model by Donsbach and Mothes (2012). It states that political disenchantment is the feeling of a lack of internal and external political efficacy on the one hand and a growing cynicism towards politics and politicians on the other. The constructs of internal and external political efficacy were both measured by six items each. Internal efficacy was measured by asking the respondents about their perceived ability to influence the political process (Wolling 2009; Pedersen 2012) and external efficacy by asking for the perceived responsiveness of politicians (Wolling 2009; Leung 2009; Pedersen 2012). For the measurement of cynicism, we used a set of four items that articulate critical statements towards the actions of politicians (Allensbach 2009; Wolling 1999; Tedesco 2011).

To incorporate the more diffuse sentiments that exist in the PEGIDA movement, we applied items dealing with fears and worries (FW), which were explicitly expressed during PEGIDA rallies. We asked about the fear of being overwhelmed by immigrants (foreign domination), the fear of extremism and more existential fears like economic decline.

To measure nationalistic sentiments, we used parts of a scale by Zick, Küpper and Hövermann (2011) which deals with typical right-wing attitudes (RWA). We excluded items measuring hostility against foreigners and racism as these issues were already covered by the GFE scale (see above) and used only the items concerning nationalism and chauvinism.

The sixth and last dimension that we added to the questionnaire was criticism of capitalism (CC). Even though it was usually expressed at the rallies, it seems to be contradictory at first glance, because anti-capitalism fits more to the left-wing part of the political spectrum. However, Dimitrov (2009) points out, it fits the Red-Brown Phenomenon within the right-wing as well.

4.3. Participants

With 860 completed interviews in the first wave, we had a response-rate of 30 percent. A similar response-rate occurred in the second wave (28%). 49 percent ($n = 424$) of those who participated in the first wave also took part one year later in the second wave. The following analysis relies on the 424 respondents who answered the questionnaire in both waves.

Despite the representative recruiting, there are some differences between the participants and the average population in Dresden. The respondents are better educated than the average citizen, and both the youngest age group (18–24) and females are underrepresented.

5. Results


The dependent variable in this study was whether the respondents share the goals of PEGIDA (at least partially) or not. Hereafter, we will divide the respondents into supporters – those respondents who share the goals of PEGIDA at least partially – and non-supporters – those respondents who do not share the goals of PEGIDA at all. In both waves of the panel study 59 percent of the respondents stated that they do not share the goals of PEGIDA at all. As we stated above, despite the fact that the panel is representatively recruited, it is not representative for the general population of Dresden. To get an impression of the bias of the panel we added the same question (sharing the goals or not) to representative telephone surveys (CATI) which are the basis for the panel recruiting. In February 2015 and 2016 – i.e. one month after the panel waves – we conducted the telephone-surveys. In February 2015, 45 percent of the inhabitants of Dresden stated that they do not share the goals of PEGIDA at all, one year later the proportion increased to 54 percent. So, we can see that in the panel studies there is a higher and stable percentage of non-supporters than in the general population of Dresden. Since this study does not try to assess the sheer quantity of PEGIDA supporters but rather the attitudes which explain this support, we can nevertheless use the PBP for our analysis. To put it simply, we are able to identify the factors behind PEGIDA support, but cannot generalize our findings to the city's population and thus we must not draw conclusions about the proportion of the population sharing these attitudes.

Before testing our analytical model, we have to examine the consistency of the proposed constructs and to find the main dimensions for those items which are not tested at all (e.g. Fears and Worries). Group-focused Enmity (GFE) contained 19 items. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) revealed five factors: hostility against foreigners, devaluation of disabled persons, devaluation of the homeless, devaluation of homosexuals and

sexism ($N = 791$, $KMO = .90$, Bartlett-Test $\chi^2(171) = 5860,14$, $p < .001$). The factor solutions described here are in line with the literature (Zick et al. 2008; Borstel, Heitmeyer 2012; Beckmann 2012), even though the original scale proposed that racism, Islamophobia, xenophobia and anti-Semitism be separated, but which constitute only one single factor in our study (GFE1: hostility against foreigners). The ten items proposed to reflect the construct of Political Disenchantment (PD) loaded on just one factor in the PCA ($N = 828$, $KMO = .93$, Bartlett-Test $\chi^2(45) = 3645,60$, $p < .001$). The 12 items mirroring the fears and worries expressed by PEGIDA are summed up in three factors: fears of being overwhelmed by immigrants (FW1: foreign domination), fears of extremism (FW2) and economic grievance (FW3) ($N = 795$, $KMO = .88$, Bartlett-Test $\chi^2(66) = 4142,36$, $p < .001$). Right-wing attitudes and anti-capitalism were asked about in one question containing seven items. PCA revealed two factors which separate the right-wing attitude (RWA) items from those mirroring anti-capitalism (CC) ($N = 824$, $KMO = .750$, Bartlett-Test $\chi^2(21) = 1711,71$, $p < .001$). Overall, the constructs show stable factor solutions in line with the proposed compilation of the items. For further analysis we used the five factors for GFE, PD (one factor), three factors for fears and worries (FW), the right-wing attitude factor (RWA), the criticism of capitalism factor (CC) and the item measuring trust in journalists.

Initial T-Tests reveal significant differences between the non-supporters and the supporters in both waves. The latter ones express far more right-wing attitudes and far more fear of being overwhelmed by immigrants. The smallest differences occur regarding sexism

Figure 2: Results of a binary-logistic regression (t,)



and criticism of capitalism and devaluation of disabled persons. While these results were somewhat expectable, further analysis should show how the different constructs perform together as predictors for support for PEGIDA. We conducted a binary-logistic regression with the dependent variable 'sharing the goals of PEGIDA at least partially' (1) and 'not sharing the goals of PEGIDA' (0) with 0 as the reference category. For the independent variables, we used the factor loadings of the factors which mirror our constructs. Figure 2 shows the findings of the binary-logistic regression analysis.

While the initial analysis shows significant differences in all dimensions, the binary-logistic regression analysis reveals that not all of the different sub-dimensions (factors) within the constructs play a role as predictors for supporting the movement. Devaluation of disabled persons (GFE2) and sexism (GFE5) – two of the factors with the smallest differences between supporters and non-supporters – seemingly do not affect whether one shares the goals of PEGIDA or not. More interesting are the findings regarding political disenchantment (PD). Despite the fact that in public and scientific discussions PD is often mentioned as a cause of the PEGIDA movement, PD does not enhance the sharing of PEGIDA goals. The same holds true for economic grievance (FW3). The most important factors driving the support for PEGIDA are hostility against foreigners (GFE1), media criticism (MC) and right-wing attitudes (RWA). These three factors doubled the probability of sharing the goals of PEGIDA. Somewhat weaker, but also influential factors are devaluation of the homeless (GFE3), devaluation of homosexuals (GFE4), fears of foreign domination (FW1) and extremism (FW2) as well as criticism of capitalism (CC). These factors slightly enhance the probability of sharing the goals of PEGIDA.

Answering RQ1, which attitudes drive sharing the goals of PEGIDA, we can conclude that political disenchantment (PD) and parts of the GFE (sexism, devaluation of disabled persons) as well as economic grievance (FW3) seemingly do not cause or drive the support for PEGIDA. Instead, the following three main factors occur: hostility against foreigners (GFE1), distrust in journalists (MC) and right-wing attitudes (RWA) such as nationalism and chauvinism doubled the probability to sympathize with the movement. These findings are in line with findings by Fieschi and Heywood (2004), Oesch (2008) and Ivarsflaten (2008).

RQ2 asked for the changes of the attitudes within one year. Table 1 shows the changes within the group of supporters from the first to the second wave, a timespan which encompasses twelve months, from January 2015 to January 2016.

Only the devaluation of disabled persons (GFE2) and the degree of sexism (GFE5) slightly decreased within the course of one year for the group of supporters. The other factors remained stable or increased slightly. Exceptions are the fear of being overwhelmed by immigrants (FW1), right-wing attitudes (RWA), hostility against foreigners (GFE1) and fear of terrorism (FW2) which rose up to 0.5 point on the 5-point scales (cf. Table 1).

To examine whether these changes influence the strength of the factors in predicting the support for PEGIDA, we repeated the PCAs as well as the binary-logistic analysis described above with the data from the second wave (t_2). With one exception, we found the same factor solutions in the PCAs as in the first wave. The exception concerns the factors devaluation of homosexuals (GFE4) and sexism (GFE5) which were separate factors in the first wave. In the second wave, the factors were combined into one. We used the existing ten

factors from the first wave and the new factor (GFE4+5) as independent variables for the second binary-logistic regression, now with eleven instead of twelve factors as independent variables. The dependent variable (sharing or not sharing the goals) remains the same.

Table 1: Changes (Mean differences) between first and second wave (supporters)

	t_1	t_2	Mean differences
Factor	M (SD)	M (SD)	(t_2-t_1)
GFE1 Hostility against foreigners	2.19 (0.72)	2.52 (0.81)	0.33
GFE2 Devaluation of disabled persons	1.64 (0.71)	1.63 (0.74)	-0.01
GFE3 Devaluation of homeless	3.04 (1.09)	3.06 (1.22)	0.02
GFE4 Devaluation of homosexuals	2.38 (1.32)	2.46 (1.28)	0.08
GFE5 Sexism	1.43 (0.71)	1.40 (0.64)	-0.03
Media Criticism	2.75 (0.66)	2.77 (0.66)	0.02
Political Disenchantment	3.64 (0.76)	3.72 (0.73)	0.08
FW1 Fear of foreign domination	3.12 (1.00)	3.61 (1.09)	0.49
FW2 Fear of extremism	3.80 (0.88)	4.12 (0.94)	0.32
FW3 economic grievance	3.38 (1.02)	3.41 (1.04)	0.03
Right-wing attitudes	3.20 (0.91)	3.57 (0.91)	0.37
Criticism of Capitalism	3.88 (0.81)	3.95 (0.79)	0.07

Note: N = 424, panelists t_1 n = 190, t_2 n = 171, five-point scales, high values means high degree of the specific attitude.

Source: Author.

While in the first wave, eight of the twelve factors in the analysis found to be influential regarding sharing of the goals of PEGIDA, in the second wave, some of the influential factors disappeared and others gained strength. At first, it has to be stated that the factors with no influence in the first wave (GFE2, PD, FW3) remain without influence. An exception is the factor sexism that merged with devaluation of homosexuals – a previously and (merged with sexism) still influential factor.

Devaluation of the homeless (GFE3), fear of extremism (FW2) and criticism of capitalism (CC) lost their influence completely. Right-wing attitudes (RWA) decreased in strength (t_1 : $b=0.819$, $\exp(b)=2.268$, $p<.001$; t_2 : $b=0.586$, $\exp(b)=1.796$, $p<.001$). Devaluation of homosexuals – in the second wave merged with sexism – remains quite stable, even though it only slightly enhances the probability of sharing the goals of PEGIDA in both waves (t_1 : devaluation of homosexuals $b=0.292$, $\exp(b)=1.339$, $p<.01$; t_2 : devaluation of homosexuals/sexism $b=0.305$, $\exp(b)=1.357$, $p<.01$).

Hostility against foreigners (GFE1) and media criticism (MC) were the strongest predictors in the second wave – even stronger than in the first wave. In the first wave, both

factors roughly doubled the probability of sharing the goals of PEGIDA (t_1 GFE1: $b = 0.773$, $\exp(b) = 2.166$, $p < .001$, t_1 MC: $b = 0.753$, $\exp(b) = 2.124$, $p < .01$). In the second wave, they tripled the chance (t_2 GFE1: $b = 1.023$, $\exp(b) = 2.783$, $p < .001$, t_2 MC: $b = 1.082$, $\exp(b) = 2.950$, $p < .001$). Foreign domination (FW1) also increased in strength. In the first wave, this fear only slightly enhanced the probability of sharing the goals, in the second wave it almost doubled the chance (t_1 : $b = 0.271$, $\exp(b) = 1.312$, $p < .05$; t_2 : $b = 0.535$, $\exp(b) = 1.708$, $p < .001$).

The regression model in the first wave explains 56 percent of the variance ($n = 702$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .56$, $\chi^2(12) = 381.88$, $p < .001$). The regression model of the second wave explains 61 percent of the variance ($n = 897$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .61$, $\chi^2(11) = 542.09$, $p < .001$). Therefore, we can conclude that the constructs we derived from literature dealing with voting of RPP worked very well to analyze the sympathies with the right-wing populist movement PEGIDA.

Answering RQ2 about the changes that can be observed after one year, we can conclude first that the picture of PEGIDA sentiments seemed to have sharpened over the course of a year. In the first wave, more factors appear in the analysis of support for PEGIDA. Some of them seem to be somewhat contradictory, e.g., criticism of capitalism towards the idea of RPP. In the second wave, the remaining factors together appear to be more plausible: a strong hostility against foreigners, fears of foreign domination, typical right-wing attitudes, devaluation of homosexuals (combined with sexism), and a strong criticism of the media. This compilation fits quite well into the textbook example of RPP described above.

We can only speculate about the causes of the described changes. Initially, it seemed to be reasonable to assume that supporters got more radicalized within a year. However, comparisons between the supporters and the non-supporters revealed that the changes within the two groups are heterogeneous. The initial thought holds true for the strongest factors we have found. For hostility against foreigners, right-wing attitudes and fears of foreign domination, the gap between the two groups has widened, but concerning devaluation of homeless people and fear of extremism the non-supporters seem to bridge the gap to the supporters. Maybe this could be an explanation for the strengthening of the aforementioned factors and for the vanishing of the last two (devaluation of the homeless and fear of extremism) in the binary-logistic analysis. These findings need further analysis.

6. Discussion

For two decades, right-wing populism has been on the rise in Europe and beyond. At the end of 2014, a movement entered the scene calling themselves Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Christian west (PEGIDA). Within a few weeks, they echoed the whole agenda of right-wing populist parties in Europe. As far as we know, PEGIDA is the first grassroots right-wing-populist protest movement in Europe. With its longevity, it has become a serious protagonist not only in Dresden (Germany). Several branches of PEGIDA tried to start similar movements – mostly with lesser success. While PEGIDA was growing, the number of verbal assaults and violent attacks towards asylum seekers and other foreigners increased dramatically all across Germany. Some politicians and scientists claim

that PEGIDA planted the seeds for these xenophobic sentiments erupting in the attacks, others counter that PEGIDA is first and foremost a manifestation of distrust in politics. This vivid discussion stimulated our two-wave panel study starting in January 2015. Contrary to other studies (Geiges et al. 2015; Daphi et al. 2015; Vorländer et al. 2015; Patzelt 2015) we did not seek to investigate the active participants of PEGIDA, but the attitudes behind the movement.

A first core finding of our study is that political disenchantment (PD) does not predict support for PEGIDA. Supporters of PEGIDA are neither more nor less disenchanted with politics than other people. This finding contradicts the results of the studies by Vorländer and colleagues (2015) and Patzelt (2015), but is in line with results by Fieschi and Heywood (2004), Oesch (2008), and Ivarsflaten (2008) regarding the predictors of right-wing-populist voting. We suppose that while a significant proportion of the population is dissatisfied with the performance of politics and politicians, citizens find different ways of coping with it. Participation in populist movements like PEGIDA is just one.

In contrast, one of the factors with the most explanatory power was the sub-dimension of GFM containing items mirroring hostility against foreigners. Xenophobic resentments combined with typical right-wing attitudes and the fear of being overwhelmed by immigrants are the most vigorous drivers of sharing the goals of PEGIDA.

Distrust in the media appears to be an important driving factor, too. Further research should be done to investigate whether the combat term of 'Lügenpresse' is instrumental in avoiding cognitive dissonance and which patterns of media usage foster this attitude (see also Plasser, Ulram 2003).

Overall, the second wave confirms the findings from the first. The explanatory factors (hostility against foreigners, right-wing attitudes, fears of foreign domination and media criticism) remain stable. Some of them get even stronger. Comparing the participants from the first and the second wave, we made two important observations: whereas supporters of the movement seem to have sharpened their attitudes (stronger hostility against foreigners, stronger right-wing attitudes, etc.), in some of the attitudes even the non-supporters slightly move in the same direction. The changes in the latter group were moderate but visible. These findings fit to the theory of the 'Extremismus der Mitte' [extremism of the center] recently described by Zick and Klein (2014) and Decker, Kiess and Brähler (2015) for Germany. Whereas some experts predicted a polarization of the society while right-wing populism gains a foothold, our findings point towards a slight but general radicalization. These changes in the fabric of our pluralist democratic society should be kept under surveillance in the future. Even though the findings are somewhat alarming, we do not know whether this shift is ongoing or just a reaction to current issues. Further research should investigate the longevity of such changes in the attitudes of the people.

Our study has several limitations. First, since the panel we used contains only inhabitants of Dresden our findings apply only to this city. It is certainly possible that similar studies in other cities or regions will reveal different compilations of factors. Second, like other online-access panels, our panel does not represent the general population of Dresden. For this reason, we can only show possible relationships between attitudes and the sympathies for PEGIDA, but cannot estimate the amount of these attitudes within the general population. Third, because of our dichotomous dependent variable we can only estimate the

probability for every single attitude enhancing the sympathies with PEGIDA. Fourth, there is further research needed that investigates the interrelationship between the independent variables in this study.

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