takes into consideration income levels, but does not account for different economic measures – such as economic insecurity, which, as Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2018) have shown examining the BES dataset, contributed to support for Brexit. Lastly, Kaufmann seems to be taking ethnic identity as a given, localizing it in evolutionary tribalism, as if it was something innate, rather than ideological. He does acknowledge that tribalism can manifest in different ways, but suggests that ethnicity is the most potent (pp. 20–21). Similar criticism has been voiced by David Aaronovitch (2018) in The Times, who pointed out that Kaufmann sees the “pro-white” whites as more authentic than the ‘deracinated’ liberal whites. Still, Kaufmann considers cosmopolitan worldview just as valid as ‘ethno-traditional nationalism’ (p. 4).

This criticism notwithstanding, Whiteshift is a highly valuable contribution to the literature on populism for two main reasons. Firstly, it popularizes the academic definition of ethnicity, as being about the shared myths of descent and culture, and not just the colour of one’s skin. This makes it easier to decouple the notion of ethnicity from minorities, and recognizes that majorities have ethnicities as well. Secondly, the book offers an antidote to populism and a way to overcome the current political polarization – a prospect of multivo-cal national identity, which offers those within ethnic majorities who value their ethnic heritage a vision of a future existence of their group in an inclusive ethnicity, while it leaves space in an inclusive nation for those of cosmopolitan outlook and those minorities who wish to preserve their particularity.

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Mounk, Yascha:

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Liberal democracy is not experiencing its best days. A quarter of a century ago the incarnation with its principles was turned into political inspiration for many citizens of the world. During the 1990s there was no serious and coherent alternative that could challenge it. However, this trust which was supported by citizens and intellectuals of that time, is now faded to a disturbing degree. Hope has been replaced by disappointment. Optimism is substituted by scepticism with intense nuances of pessimism.

The optimism that dominated after the collapse of communism was conditioned by a number of factors. First, the spectacular fall of Marxist ideology had discredited this system. Secondly, theoretical alternatives did not enjoy any great support, with the exception of some states in the Middle East. Third, the unique Chinese model of ‘combining capital-
ism under the flag of communism’ was unable to attract admiration for universal application. Thus, the triumphant post-socialist climate influenced the vision and hope that the future would only belong to liberal democracy.

In this enthusiastic atmosphere, Francis Fukuyama would solemnly declare liberal democracy as the ultimate *telos* of history. Consequently, any ideological alternative was condemned by ‘history’ to fail. Under the theoretical vision of this scheme, it seemed that the future would not change much from the present and the past.

However, this conclusion was criticized by many other theorists as hasty and ‘ naïve’, more based on fantasy than on the dynamics of real political, social and historical processes. It is worth mentioning especially the position of the political scientist Fareed Zakaria. In his article ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, published in *Foreign Affairs* (1997), though not directly as an attack on Fukuyama’s futurological theses, he warned about the obstacles that liberal democracy might face in its claim of universal expansion.

The political experience in the Western world after World War II has led us to perceive liberalism and democracy as inseparable. However, Zakaria concluded that these two are not necessarily interconnected (Zakaria, 1997, p. 27). Their combination was more a result of some socio-political coincidences than the product of an inherent logical and historical necessity. They can operate together within an institutional and political order. But, nothing prevents them from functioning separately or their relationship from being characterized by contrasting antagonisms between them. According to Zakaria, during the 1990s the world, in addition to seeing a wave of democratic processes, at the same time was experiencing the spread of a model opposite to the Western democracies, that of the illiberal democracies (p. 24).

These tensions within the democratic order, as well as the structural crisis that is currently characterizing liberal democracies, is analyzed by a professor of political science from Harvard University, Yascha Mounk, in his latest book: *People vs. democracy – why our freedom is in danger and how to save it*.

Combining his academic background with that of a practical politics, Mounk provides us with an impressive insight, based on empirical data, on the imminent developments that have encompassed liberal democracies that are being manifested in various forms on almost a global scale. The achievements of autocratic leaders, the empowerment of populist movements, the deconsolidation of many traditional political parties, the anti-liberal impulses, avoiding some of the basic democratic political conditions, constitute only some of the significant ‘tectonic shifts’ that are taking place today.

However, unlike other authors, Mounk argues that the crisis in liberal democracy is not only a product of the predominance of illiberal democracy, but is a result of the fragmentation of its two basic components: democracy and liberalism.

So far these two components have coexisted in a unique alliance within a systemic structure in the Western world, providing the prospect of security, peace, solidarity, economic development and social welfare. It seems that recently they are in a process of separation and disintegration, without being aware that the detached journey one from the other can produce consequences for both: democracy and liberalism. It is this separation process that has led to the deepening of the void between these two components and to the production of a paradoxical system in which neither illiberal democracy nor undemocratic liberalism dominates (p. 14).

This crack today is causing political conflicts. Intensifying confrontations, not only as
a battle between liberal democracy and its ideologi- cal opponents, but between its constituent parts in order to eliminate one another, are establishing the essence of the crisis and chronic instability of this system. Thus, the harmony that existed before for the protection of individual liberal rights from the ‘tyranny of the majority’ through the rule of law and empowerment of the people, thanks to the multiple mechanisms of democracy, has now been undermined.

These antagonisms between ‘popular will’ on the one hand, and ‘liberal values’ on the other hand, Mounk describes as a tension between ‘democracy without rights and rights without democracy’ (pp. 27–53).

With the first model, ‘democracy without rights’, today is identified the populist rhetoric of national homogeneity, the affirmation of political equality only for members of the same national origin, preservation of cultural and ethnic identity, the promise of full restoration of state sovereignty, the economy and politics in the hands of the people in defiance of supranational structures and global corporations, as well as the glorification of the popular will as the supreme authority and in antinomy with the normative constitutional principles of the liberal order. Politically, the electoral success of many of the populist movements, in Europe and elsewhere, is the result of affirmation of this line of action. However, the fact cannot be denied that such entities have a democratic potential, but their problem is that they are illiberal.

On the other hand, contrary to the populist currents that are inclined to avoid constitutional and legal discretion in the name of the people (p. 35), another model is evolving: that of ‘rights without democracy’ (p. 53). The latter is characterized by Mounk as an attempt by liberal elites to exclude people from decision-making on important political and public issues ‘under the name of rights’, from immigration issues to other topics of a technocratic and bureaucratic nature.

These are considered the blocking trends that in the meantime have worsened the political conditions of liberal democracy. They have destabilized its potential and have influenced the creation of a general perception that liberal democracy is experiencing a turbulent political condition.

Empirical public opinion research data, particularly among young people, express this desperation. For instance, today the percentage of people’s trust which does not consider as a vital element life under democracy is significantly increased. This is happening both in the US and in many Western European countries.

On the other hand, the attraction of authoritarian governing methods has marked a frightening increase. In 1995, 34% of respondents in the United States, aged between 18 and 24, considered that national leadership by a strong leader not subordinated to Congress or other power controlling and balancing troops, was rated as good or very good. The figure for this category in 2018 reached 44%. In Germany, admiration for a strong leader rose from 16% in 2017 to 33%, in France from 35% to 48%, and in the UK, from 25% in 1990 to 50% (pp. 109–112).

Taking these data into account, Mounk concludes that traditional democracies are experiencing a destabilizing process. A catalytic agent for these challenges is economic turbulence. For instance, from 1965 to 1985, the income of a typical American family doubled. Whereas, since 1985, household income has remained unchanged, despite the fact that economic growth increased (p. 154).

Despite this pessimistic perspective, Mounk is not tempted by the anti-liberal doctrines of democracy. To escape from this crisis, he defends the argument that the values of liberalism and democracy are non-negotiable (p. 97). If we are obliged to submit to ‘individ-
ual rights’ or the ‘popular will’ then we have made an impossible solution because if a system revokes individual rights by worshiping at the altar of popular will, power inevitably would be directed against the people. A system that abandoned the popular will with the only objective of protecting individual rights can become a repressive structure against both (p. 98). Therefore, the harmony between them is crucial and the only means to keep the system of liberal democracy functioning properly.

Mounk’s book is written using clear and understandable logic. This makes it very useful and functional not only for scholars of political science, but for all those who are interested in understanding more about the latest developments regarding the challenges that liberal democracy is facing. The first part deals with the crisis that this political system is encountering by diagnosing in detail the de-consolidation process of its values. The second part deals with the main elements that have influenced the crisis of this system, focusing especially on three of them: social media, economic stagnation and identity issues. The third part identifies the political, economic and social tools that, according to the author, should be used to restore liberal democracy.

By using comparative methods, the author analyzes multiple cases of states and identifies the similarities and differences between them. This enables the reader to become familiar with contextual factors such as: political culture, history, attitudes towards authority etc., and their role for analyzing the political system of liberal democracy. The author provides statistical data to support his arguments, thus quantifying his analysis and making it more measurable. He is very enthusiastic about liberal democracy and, at the same time, is very convinced that, despite its current challenges and difficulties, the system of liberal democracy will be triumphant. But, to make this possible he suggests that we all must mobilize and contribute to ‘do what we can to save liberal democracy’ (p. 266).

References:


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